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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

]
i
]

DONALD WAYNE GAMBRELL,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900559-CA

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established
by 78-2A-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction following a jury
trial on the charges of three counts of Negligent Homicide.

The

Defendant was sentenced to serve three (3) consecutive one year
terms

in the Iron County Jail,

one year on each count of

negligent homicide.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are whether the
Court, under the facts of this case, has the authority to impose
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences upon this Defendant,
and whether the court was without jurisdiction by failure of the
County Attorney to post a bond upon taking office.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes which are believed to be determinative in
this matter are 76-1-401 and 76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

These

statutes are reproduced

in total as the

addendum to this brief.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

Judgment,

Sentence

and

Commitment from the Fifth Circuit Court of Iron County, Cedar
City Department, following a jury trial in which the Defendant
was convicted of three counts of Negligent Homicide.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of
three counts of Negligent Homicide.
to Utah

The Defendant did not return

for sentencing until October

16, 1990, and he was

sentenced to three consecutive terms of one year in the Iron
County Jail.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Defendant was sentenced to serve three consecutive
terms of

one year

in the Iron County Jail with the court

maintaining jurisdiction to review the sentence after one year.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

August

20,

1989,

the

Defendant,

Gambrell was driving a semi-trailer truck
mine-framing
Utah. (T.213)
west.

materials

on Highway

U-14

Donald

Wayne

loaded with steel

east

of

Cedar

City,

Mr. Gambrell's direction of travel was east to

Traveling west to east up U-14, which is a mountainous,
2

paved,

two-lane

highway,

were

Robert

G. Baldwin, and Colette M. Griffin. (T.47)

C. Griffin,

Neoma

Near milepost 13 of

the highway, on a downgrade, Mr. Gambrell lost the braking system
in

the

truck

and

control. (T.22 0-222)

it

began

to

accelerate

out

of

In an attempt to drive the truck across the

on-coming lane of travel and into a hillside, Mr. Gambrell struck
the vehicle occupied by Robert C. Griffin, Neoma G. Baldwin, and
Colette M. Griffin killing all three. (T.225)

Mr. Gambrell was

convicted in a jury trial on December 14, 1989, of three counts
of negligent homicide.

He was sentenced to one year in the Iron

County Jail on each count, the sentences to run consecutively,
one to follow the other.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial count does not have authority under the
Criminal Negligence statute to impose three consecutive sentences
upon this Defendant in this case.
The trial court was without jurisdiction to try this
Defendant because of the failure of the Iron County Attorney to
post a bond upon taking office.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT IN THIS CASE CAN BE PUNISHABLE
ONLY

BY

ONE

SENTENCE

IN

THE

IRON

COUNTY

JAIL,

NOT

THREE

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
The
76-1-402, Utah

court's

attention

Code Annotated,
3

is

drawn

specifically

to

1953, as amended, wherein a

Defendant may be prosecuted in a single action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.

However, when

the same act of a Defendant establishes offenses which may be
punished in different ways, the act can only be punished in one
of the multiple ways.

In the present instance before the court,

Mr. Gambrell's "act" was not an act at all but rather an omission
found by the jury to rise to the degree of criminal negligence.
The jury apparently believed that Mr. Gambrell was criminally
negligent in driving his heavily laden semi-trailer truck down
Highway U-14 with brakes that were not properly adjusted.

The

case law presently pertinent to the point raised on appeal is
most closely found in the case of State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61
(Utah Ct.App., 1989).
its

factual

setting.

However, this case varies substantially in
In the Mane

case, the

Defendant

was

involved in an intentional act of firing a firearm, which act
harmed

two

(2) different

victims.

In upholding

consecutive

rather than concurrent sentences, this court reasoned in the
Mane case that the Defendant's "act" was voluntary and that
because of the definition under Utah State Law of a voluntary
act, the Defendant could be punished with consecutive sentences
for both the homicide and aggravated assault,,

This court has

cited with approval the case of State v. James, 631 P.2d 854
(Utah, 1981), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated,
"A defendant who commits an act of violence with
the intent to harm more than one person or by means
likely to cause harm to more than several persons is
more culpable than a defendant that harms only one
person."
4

In the present

case, this

Defendant, Mr. Gambrell, did not

perform any act but simply involved himself in a fact setting
which the jury determined to be criminally negligent.
these

circumstances,

it

would

appear

that

the

Under

Defendant's

criminal negligence can only be punished in one of the multiple
ways and that he may be incarcerated for only one year.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THIS
DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY TO
POST A BOND UPON TAKING OFFICE.

requires

17-16-11,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

that

Iron

County

Attorney

execute

the

faithful performance of his office.

as

amended,

a bond

for

The actual bond purportedly

filed by the Iron County Attorney is entitled "Public Employeefs
Blanket Bond" and is attached to the Defendant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed with
the Circuit Court on February 14, 1990.

However, neither the

bond from Western Surety Company known as a public employee's
blanket bond

nor the representations of the bonding company

address the fact that Scott M. Burns, the Iron County Attorney,
had not executed a bond for the faithful performance of his
office within the time required by statute.
The undersigned, at the time I served as Iron County
Attorney from 1979 through 1982, was required to first obtain a
bond from Western Surety Company and sign the same and deliver
and file it with the Iron County Clerk prior to taking the oath
5

of office as the Iron County Attorney on January 1, 1979.
Under the provisions of 52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the office of Iron County Attorney is vacant is
vacant and was vacant sixty (60) days after the beginning of the
term of Mr. Burns on January 1, 1987.

The case which appears to

be controlling is now ninety-years old, but the case of State
v. Beddo, 63 P.96 (Utah, 1900), provides that the trial court has
only jurisdiction to dismiss the matter when the prosecutor is
not appropriately qualified.
This Defendant takes the position that because of the
failure of Mr. Burns to qualify for office under the provisions
of 52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which statute
was upheld and supported in the case of Stcite Ex Rel. Stain
v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775, the Iron County Attorney's office
has

no

jurisdiction

in

this

matter

and

the

case

must

be

dismissed.
CONCLUSION
This
reverse

and

Defendant

remand

this

specifically
matter

to

requests this
the

Circuit

court to

Court

with

instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction or in
the alternative to rule that the Defendant's sentence be limited
to one year on the three consecutive sentences for each count
under the single criminal episode act.
DATED this

o

day of January, 1991.

JAJ4ES L. SHUMATE
6
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and

foregoing

BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Scott

M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah
84720, this

o

day of January, 1991, first class postage

fully prepaid.
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MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
76-1-401.

"Single criminal episode" defined —
Joinder of offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling
the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
1975
76-1-402.

Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode — Included offenses.
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code,
the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned
on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein: or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as
a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless there
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged
but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant
1974

